Erik Wibbels, University of Washington Designing Federalism is a book about much more than federalism. Although explicitly aimed at the particularly prickly problem of federal stability, the book covers an impressive swath of intellectual territory with regard to constitutional government, political parties, and representation. In doing so, the authors have written an ambitious book that seeks to lay out a series of institutional principles for prospective reformers. That being the case, it makes for interesting reading at this unique historical moment. With two major nation-building exercises under way in Afghanistan and Iraq, both cases in which academics and policy makers have discussed the promise of federalism as a means to promote political stability in deeply divided societies, it is worth asking if social scientists can provide much institutional advice that might contribute to peace. The authors of Designing Federalism initially answer this question with an emphatic "yes." Indeed, throughout the work, they draw analogies to engineering, suggesting that though much more complicated, the project of designing institutions of government operates on the same general scientific principles as building airplanes.
The engineering problem the authors set out for themselves is an exceptionally challenging one: How to design institutions such that politicians have incentives to leave them alone? Recognizing that institutions have sharp redistributive consequences and that this generates incentives for elites to alter them, the authors want to know why some institutions show impressive stability, whereas others become subject to contention. Their answer to the question is ingenious and helps explain why research on federalism has been stuck in neutral for much of the past five decades. Rather than focusing on the institutions distinct to federations-the balance between 446 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / May 2005 national and regional competencies, the nature of regional representation in national policy making, the relations among regional units-the authors point us in a different direction. Constitutional stability is to be found neither in the nature of constitutions themselves nor the rules governing the changing of constitutions but in the institutions that govern political competition among elites-and party systems in particular.
The book is most persuasive and innovative in emphasizing the role of political parties in shaping the stability of federal systems. Eschewing the traditional focus on constitutional parameters, the authors suggest that the nature of parties and electoral competition fundamentally shape the incentive of elites to encroach (or not) on constitutional limitations. Where parties are horizontally and vertically integrated and encourage politicians at all levels of government to avoid divisive challenges to the institutional status quo, the core constitutional rules are likely to be respected. Only thus will the institutions of government be endogenously self-enforcing. In the absence of such party systems, politicians are left in a context of "uninstitutionalized bargaining" that encourages sharp distributional conflicts over the fundamental rules of the political game. Ethnic conflict, economic collapse, and regime crises are only a few of the more prominent results we are likely to see in such contexts.
Although Riker emphasized the importance of parties in shaping federal politics 50 years ago, Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova have significantly advanced our understanding of what makes for a unifying party system, how such systems affect the strategic considerations of elites, and the implications such strategic thinking has for political stability. Riker, for instance, explained neither the precise mechanisms whereby party systems affect constitutional stability nor the key ingredients of integrated party systems. The authors move the theoretical ball forward by explaining that parties contribute to stability by generating incentives for political elites to cultivate partisan labels, expand their electoral coalitions, and thereby "isolate disputes from the part of the political process that can divide an electorate and inflame passions" (p. 186). They also suggest that such party systems exist where among other things partisan organizations exist at all levels of government, electoral coattails encourage partisan cooperation across levels of government, and national electoral success requires parties to campaign locally (p. 192) . They also provide a number of institutional features that are likely to contribute to such systems (chap. 7).
Although the authors'theoretical argument is innovative, wide ranging, and promising, it is somewhat difficult to assess its empirical validity. Indeed, the authors themselves characterize the empirical approach of the book as exploratory or illustrative rather than a rigorous test of the theoretical propositions (p. 82). Thus, despite surveying an impressive swath of political history in the United States, Germany, India, Australia, and Canada and less detailed treatments of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Russia, Belgium, Switzerland, the European Union, and elsewhere, the authors' research design is not aimed at systematically testing the argument. Granted, the methodological challenges of comparing federations with diverse partisan institutions across multiple phases of history are monumental, but we never really hear why some comparisons or cases, many of which receive little methodological justification, BOOK REVIEWS 447 are particularly good ones. As a result, we are left with a number of questions, such as why Argentina, which shares almost all of the key characteristics of the integrative party system of the United States, has suffered a prolonged history of regime instability. Questions about particular cases aside, another important result of this empirical approach is that readers are left with relatively few unambiguous lessons regarding the design of federal institutions. Indeed, as the empirical discussion of the cases reveals the diverse array of institutions amenable to either stability or flux, one gets a palpable sense that the authors' initial enthusiasm for engineering federal systems diminishes over the course of the book. Indeed, by the end of the book, the authors become quite measured in their tone, suggesting the possibility that "our science of institutional design is far too primitive to allow us to discern or even measure acceptable degrees of inconsistency and incompleteness" (p. 300) and that to suppose that even the most comprehensive theory would allow us to anticipate fully the consequences of any specific design requires a degree of hubris that was not shared even by arguably the most successful corps of political engineers, the Framers of the U.S. Constitution. (p. 301) Admitting the complex ways in which institutions interact with one another and underlying social conditions, the authors ultimately eschew easy design prescriptions in favor of a more modest goal, explaining that "we must instead endeavor to assess the interplay of self-interest and institutional design with the hope that our political engineering project will at least contribute ultimately to a more refined theory" (p. 301).
For the most part, these hedges are political science at its best: researchers thinking hard about issues, attempting to evaluate theoretical principles by looking at the real world, and being honest about the limitations of what we know and can therefore prescribe. There is one issue, however, for which the problem is probably more fundamental, namely, in the book's ambiguous treatment of the relationship between institutions and a society's social, economic, and political characteristics. On one hand, the authors recognize that many institutions are endogenous to underlying societal fundamentals and that once established, institutions interact dynamically with those fundamentals. Thus, a society's ethnic makeup, level of development, norms, political traditions, beliefs, social structure, definition of property rights, culture, legal practices, and so on are all deemed to interplay with the institutional parameters on which the authors focus (see, e.g., the discussions on pp. 79, 82, 146, 149, 158-159, 161, 164, 241, 262, 300, and 333) . In recognizing the role of these noninstitutional factors, the authors explain that the "argument here is merely a restatement of the idea that a constitution should be molded to the culture it serves" (p. 159) and emphasize that any institutional recommendations we might offer must take the form of a mechanism whose parts are not only consistent with the circumstances in question-with preexisting social norms, preexisting political-economic interests, preexisting political structures, and with prior democratic experience-insofar as that is possible. (p. 300) Yet on the whole, societies' fundamental social characteristics are relegated to the sidelines. Explaining their overwhelming emphasis on institutions, the authors explain that a constitution is necessarily imbedded in a game that consists of society's general structure-its system of norms, conventions, and those things one might choose to call culture. Here we assume that many of the components of this supergame lie outside the realm of conscious design so that we can focus on formal rules and the question of whether choices exist that encourage federal stability regardless of culture. (p. 161) This justification is curious on a number of fronts. First, if underlying social characteristics matter and interact in important ways with institutions, it is unclear why their stickiness should be left aside. It is one thing to suggest that social structure or norms cannot be manipulated, but if they affect the likelihood of certain institutions developing and the way those institutions perform, it does seem that they should be subject to coherent theorizing. It is, of course, true that "we cannot discuss all of society" (p. 295), but just as any institutionalist focuses not on all institutions but rather on those that are expected to matter most, it would seem incumbent on the authors to think systematically about what precise features of societies' primal material matter most and how they interact with institutions. Second, the authors imply that by focusing on parameters that are subject to conscious design, they will be able to deduce some general institutional prescriptions that are applicable regardless of a society's makeup. This makes considerable sense: If institutional design is to mean much, introducing institutions across societies should produce predictable outcomes. Yet such a claim contradicts the notion that institutions are socially embedded and interact with all of the noninstitutional factors mentioned above. Here the authors cannot have it both ways. Either institutional effects are independent of underlying social attributes and are thus transferable to diverse contexts or they are socially embedded, and their effects are contingent on the society in which they are placed.
Indeed, the tension between simultaneously recognizing and bracketing the relationship between institutional design and social context is present at the heart of the authors' chief argument regarding parties. On one hand, the book provides a number of key features of integrated party systems and discusses the kinds of institutions that are likely to lead to such features. On the other hand, the authors recognize that the designs of parties and electoral systems are themselves endogenous. They explain that " [parties] , as much as anything else, are the product of design-the design of institutions that compel politicians to erect parties of a particular sort because that sort, and not some other, serves their interests" (p. 196) . In discussing the development of U.S. parties, the authors note that background conditions "appear to have made integrated parties the only political alternative" (p. 235). What, if such is the case, is an institutional designer to do? To return to current events, can institutional engineering work in Afghanistan and Iraq, or are the underlying social conditions simply too messy?
If Designing Federalism does not resolve this conundrum, it is not alone, for nowhere in the attempt to understand the ways in which institutions more generally are endogenous do we find a wholly satisfying answer. Thus, instead of delivering the institutionalists' holy grail, the authors have provided a thought-provoking book that will provide motivation for a host of theoretical and empirical work. We should all be so lucky in our own work. Indeed, it is a testament to the book that its title is something of a misnomer. Above and beyond federalism, this is a book that grapples with some of the largest, most important questions in the social sciences. That it makes a serious contribution in so many areas is a testament to its quality. Benjamin O. Fordham, Binghamton University Why do major powers undertake costly military and diplomatic interventions in regions that are relatively unimportant for their national security? Why do they sometimes persist in these interventions after it is clear that they are failing? These questions have puzzled scholars of international relations at least since Thucydides' account of Athens's ill-fated Sicilian expedition. As the present debates over American intervention in Iraq suggest, they have contemporary resonance as well as historical importance. With Balancing Risks, Jeffrey Taliaferro becomes the latest in a long line of scholars to turn their attention to these issues.
Balancing Risks uses prospect theory to unlock the puzzle of peripheral intervention by major powers. Building on the work of psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, the central insight of prospect theory is that individuals value the avoidance of loss more than the achievement of gain. This psychological tendency causes them to deviate from the behavior suggested by standard expected utility theory in potentially important ways. For example, Kahneman and Tversky's experiments suggested that most people prefer a guaranteed $240 to a gamble with a 25% chance of winning $1,000, even though the expected value of the gamble is higher. At the same time, most people will accept greater risks to avoid what they perceive to be losses. For this reason, a 75% chance of losing $1,000 is preferable to a sure loss of less than $750 (p. 32). Because policy makers must often make risky choices in the international arena, prospect theory offers one possible way of understanding how they do so. Although Taliaferro is not the first to apply prospect theory to foreign policy choices, it appears particularly well suited to the class of decisions he seeks to explain in Balancing Risks.
Taliaferro adapts concepts from prospect theory into what he calls a "balance of risk" model of foreign policy decision making. He argues that decision makers' willingness to choose risky foreign policy options depends on whether they see these
